

In Hardware We Trust? ENRICHING THE WORLD WITH HARDWARE SECURITY RESEARCH

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We create world-changing technology that enriches the lives of every person on earth

Appreciate the Big Picture



Emerging threat landscapes

RV1 – Identify emerging threats on area X and characterize attack feasibility

RV2 – Research and propose architectural mitigations

RV3 – Identify methodology to detect associated vulnerabilities

Emerging threat landscapes

Increasing window of risk exposure

Over 160K vulnerabilities have been documented between 1999 to 2019 Over half were reported in the last 5 years

REFERENCE: Silicon as Code, the Cybersecurity Vulnerability Paradox, and the Transparency Requirements for a 21st Century Processor Vendor, Frank Dickson, IDC Signature White Paper

Emerging threat landscapes

Increasing window of risk exposure

Security requirements continue to evolve after product launch

Emerging threat landscapes

Increasing window of risk exposure

Security requirements continue to evolve after product launch

Disproportionate expectations on product security vs. functionality

Emerging threat landscapes

Increasing window of risk exposure

Security requirements continue to evolve after product launch

Disproportionate expectations on product security vs. functionality

Robust In-field update infrastructure still uncommon

Dive Deep to the Fundamentals

Technology enriches people's lives when it is secure Hardware security is harder than it seems Challenges take industry and academia working together to address

Where should we start?

Dive Deep: Common Hardware Weaknesses

General Circuit & Logic Design Concerns Privilege Separation & Access Control Debug & Test Power, Clock & Reset Security Flow Security Primitives & Cryptography Manufacturing & Life Cycle Management

Deep Dive: How can Security Research Help?



Semiconductor Research Corporation (SRC) Industry Led e-Seminar, January 2021

Research Thrust: Systemic Mitigations

Robust building blocks and timely security intelligence for hardware designers

Fault-resilient electronics and circuits
Future-proof security primitives
Robust in-field update capability
Privacy-preserving telemetry



Research Thrust: Security-Aware Design Automation

How would a smart Electronic Design Automation framework supporting secure-by-construction look like?

Offer INSIGHTS ... not just DATA ... WHEN and WHERE needed

Research Thrust: Auto Detection & Remediation

What does it take for an Intelligent Assistant to work like a seasoned security researcher?

Review & enumerate early concerns
Verify in the most optimized & effective manner
Recommend mitigation options
Learn & address similar issues proactively

Collaborate Passionately & Genuinely



Collaborate: Hardware Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)



94 - Hardware Design

		1194 -	Hardware Design	
ost		— <u> </u>	Manufacturing and Life Cycle Management Concerns - (1195)	
us	1		• Osemiconductor Defects in Hardware Logic with Security-Sensitive Implications - (1248)	
ors	121		🔮 Improper Scrubbing of Sensitive Data from Decommissioned Device - (1266)	
			🙂 Product Released in Non-Release Configuration - (1269)	
Ge			🙂 Device Unlock Credential Sharing - (1273)	
00			🛯 🔮 Missing Protection Against Hardware Reverse Engineering Using Integrated Circuit (IC) Imaging Techniques - (127	8)
		-	🕒 😉 Unprotected Confidential Information on Device is Accessible by OSAT Vendors - (1297)	
		— <u></u>	Security Flow Issues - (1196)	
			• ODMA Device Enabled Too Early in Boot Phase - (1190)	
			• One of Untrusted Execution Core Before Enabling Fabric Access Control - (1193)	
			🕒 Hardware Logic with Insecure De-Synchronization between Control and Data Channels - (1264)	
			🛛 📵 Insufficient Protections on the Volatile Memory Containing Boot Code - (1274)	
			B Missing Ability to Patch ROM Code - (1310)	
			🙂 Missing Immutable Root of Trust in Hardware - (1326)	
			O Security Version Number Mutable to Older Versions - (1328)	
		— <u></u>	Integration Issues - (1197)	
			B Hardware Child Block Incorrectly Connected to Parent System - (1276)	
		_= C	Privilege Separation and Access Control Issues - (1198)	
			O Incorrect Default Permissions - (276)	
			Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy') - (441)	
			Improper Isolation of Shared Resources on System-on-a-Chip (SoC) - (1189)	
			System-on-Chip (SoC) Using Components without Unique, Immutable Identifiers - (1192)	
			Binsufficient Granularity of Access Control - (1220)	
		_	Inclusion of Indocumented Features or Chicken Bits - (1242)	
		_	Industrial of order and the of the order of the orde	
			B Register Interface Allows Software Access to Sensitive Data or Security Settings - (1252)	
			(i) Policy Liese Obeolete Encoding - (1252)	
		_	Only outprovide outprovide and assigned Consistently Retween Control and Data Agents - (1268)	
			O Access Control Check Implemented After Asset is Accessed - (1280)	
			General Security Identifier Mechanism - (1994)	
			Material Security International (1254) Material International (1254) Material International (1254)	
			Generation of Incorrect Security Tokens - (1270)	
			Bincorrect Decoding of Security Hontifiers (1290)	
			Binorrect Conversion of Security Identifiers (1292)	
			Resing Protection Mechanism for Alternate Hardware Interface - (1200)	
			Resing Security Identifier - (1302)	
			(i) Non-Transparent Sharing of Microarchitectural Resources - (13/3)	
			A Minimum parter Entertion for Personatric Data Values - (1314)	
			A Missing Support for Society Features in Operatin Satisfy	
			(a) Unauthorized Error Injection Can Degrade Hardware Redundancy - (1334)	
		0	General Circuit and Logic Design Concerns - (110)	
			B Silver to Disable Besprind Bits (1239)	
			Pandre to Disable Reserved Bits - (1209)	
			Controllect Register Defaults of Module Parameters - (1221)	
			O Incorrect Register Defaults or Module Parameters - (1221)	
			G Fallure to Disable Reserved Bits - (1209)	
		-8 0	General Circuit and Logic Design Concerns - (1199)	
			O Unauthorized Error Injection Can Degrade Hardware Redundancy - (1334)	
			Missing Support for Security Features in On-chip Fabrics or Buses - (1318)	
			O Missing Write Protection for Parametric Data Values - (1314)	In
			an erest transfer and an eresting at the antitication of the anti-	

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Collaborate: Hardware CWE

CWE 4.0 released with HW CWE

AUG'20

Feb'20

CAPEC/CWE Advisory Board formed with 15 institutions as founding members

Ост'20

HW CWE Special Interest Group formed with 20+ institutions meeting monthly

Collaborate: Building a Diverse Community



Princeton-Intel Research Experience for Undergraduates (REU) Program

Princeton University's Department of Electrical Engineering, in partnership with Intel, invites rising college juniors to apply to participate in a research experience program focused on computer security. We seek students interested in research (although experience is not required) and welcome applicants from all majors but with a preference for students majoring in computer/electrical engineering and computer science.

Students chosen for the program will spend the summer of 2021 at Princeton University conducting computer security research under the

Application Link: http://bit.ly/Princeton-IntelREU

guidance and mentorship of a Princeton faculty member with active mentoring from researchers at Intel.

The program is especially

contribute to the diversity

interested in gualified

and excellence of our

academic community

and STEM fields as

other historically

a whole. Women and

underrepresented groups

in STEM disciplines are

strongly encouraged to

apply. Applicants must

demonstrate an interest in

STEM-related disciplines

and curiosity about

research.

candidates who can

Apply: November 1, 2020-January 22, 2021

DATES:

Decisions by: January 31, 2021 Summer Research Experience for **Undergraduates Program:** June 2021-August 2021

ELIGIBILITY:

U.S. citizens and permanent residents

Rising juniors in summer 2021 with good academic standing

All STEM majors welcome: Computer/Electrical Engineering and Computer Science majors preferred

PRINCETON School of Engineering

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PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

REFERENCE: http://bit.ly/Princeton-IntelREU

Collaborate: HACK@HARD Hardware CTF

HACK@DAC

San Francisco, CA July 11 - July 15, 2021

HACK@Sec2020

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Hardware Capture the Flag

ORGANIZED BY

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REFERENCE: https://hackathard.com/

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